For example we use the Multimax compiled dataset of small earthquakes and quarry explosions in more » Israel to test regional discriminants at local distances with mixed results. Given the lack of regional recordings of underground nuclear tests in most of the world, we are making use of mining and industrial explosions to test discriminants. Calibration is required to confidently use these stations to identify and discriminate between earthquakes, mine-related events and clandestine nuclear explosions, particularly for small to moderate seismic events recorded regionally at only a few stations. The recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provides for an international network of primary and auxiliary seismic monitoring stations (IMS) to verify its compliance. Data availability and authentication statistics are compiled and examined for problems. Data sent from the station in an IMS-standard format (CD-1 or IMS-1) are analyzed for compliance with the specified protocol and to ensure that the station data (sensor and state-of-health) are accurately transmitted. Components of the station are tested for compliance with technical specifications, such as timing and noise levels of sampled data, and monitoring of tamper detection equipment. Station design is evaluated for security and reliability considerations, and to ensure that operational procedures and documentation are adequate. System evaluation includes station design reviews, component testing, and operational testing of station equipment. Sandia National Laboratories has developed procedures, facilities, and tools that can be used to assist in evaluating more » IMS stations for compliance with certification requirements. These requirements are verified by the PTS during a 3-component process that includes initial station assessment, testing and evaluation, and certification. Working Group B of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has established requirements for the quality, availability, and surety of data received at the International Data Centre (IDC). « lessĪll stations planned for the International Monitoring System (IMS) must be certified by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) prior to acceptance to ensure that the monitoring stations initially meet the required specifications. This work supports the US policy to seek realistic arms control agreements while maintaining our national security. The articles in the special issue of Sundiu Technology describe some of our current contributions to verification technology. Our Technical On-site Inspection Facility is the national test bed for perimeter and portal monitoring technology and the prototype for the inspection portal that was recently installed in the USSR under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces accord. In the mid-l980s, arms-control interest shifted to facility monitoring and on-site inspection. In less than 18 months, we fielded the National Seismic Station, an unattended observatory for in-country monitoring of nuclear tests. In the late 1970s, negotiations to further limit underground nuclear testing were being actively pursued. This program grew and now includes systems more » for monitoring the movement and storage of nuclear materials, detecting tampering, and transmiting sensitive data securely. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was ratified in 1970, we began to develop technologies to protect nuclear materials from falling into unauthorized hands. This activity has continued to expand and diversify. In the late 1950s, Sandia developed satellite-borne nuclear burst detection systems to support the treaty banning atmospheric nuclear tests. The US will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. The DOE and DoD share responsibility for this vital part of national security. Nuclear deterrence, a cornerstone of US national security policy, has helped prevent global conflict for over 40 years.
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